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The Impact of Policies on Poverty Dynamics




In this paper we model employment and poverty states as a discrete ﬁrst-order Markov
process, taking into account the endogeneity of schooling and of the initial states. Using
this model, we asses the impact of diﬀerent policies on the poverty dynamics by ex-post
microsimulation. Each policy evaluated in this paper can be considered an exemplar of
one of the competing paradigms guiding social policy: the traditional welfare state, the
active welfare state and the knowledge-based society.
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Introduction
It is a well established fact that the mobility into and out of poverty is rather high. Bane and
Elwood (1986), for instance, report that “60 percent of those persons just beginning a spell of
poverty will exit within two years”. Some of the consequences of this observation are that the
fraction of persistent poor is smaller and the fraction of people that were ever poor is larger
than the instantaneous fraction of poor. Apart from obvious implications for policy, similar
observations, combined with increased data availability, have lead to a remarkable output
focusing on the dynamics of social exclusion and poverty.
Among the recent research on poverty dynamics we ﬁnd relatively simple models for
poverty entry and exit with varying degrees of attention for diﬀerent complications. Cap-
pellari and Jenkins (2002), for instance, use a ﬁrst-order Markov chain model and control
for endogeneity of the initial conditions and for attrition. Breen and Moisio (2004) use a
latent mover-stayer model with correction for measurement error in the poverty status. A
more sophisticated approach models the duration before exit out of and re-entry into poverty
(Callens (2004) for 10 EC countries, Canto (2002) for Spain, Devicienti (2001) for the UK,
Finnie and Sweetman (2003) for Canada, Stevens (1999) for a US sample, taking into ac-
count unobserved heterogeneity). Income mobility has also been modelled in a similar fashion
1(Cappellari (2001), DiPrete and McManus (2000), Jenkins (2000), Cantó (2000), Böheim et
al. (1999), Stewart and Swaﬃeld (1999)). A diﬀerent but related research question considers
persistence in welfare beneﬁt uptake (Gustafsson et al. (2004), see also Alcock (2004) for a
general discussion and Noble et al. (1998) for an overview).
In this paper we present a joint Markov model for employment and poverty, conditional
on educational attainment. This model is estimated in several stages. The three observed
schooling levels are modelled using an ordered logit model. We consider the states employment
and unemployment and estimate them with a state-dependent logit model. With respect to
poverty we discern three states: insuﬃcient protection (IP), minimum income (MI) and non-
poverty (NP), which are state-dependently estimated using a multinomial logit model. To
correct for the endogeneity of schooling and employment we include the generalized residuals
(Cox and Snell (1968), Gouriéroux et al. (1987)) of the previous stages in each regression.
This amounts to Heckman’s (1976, 1978) control function approach adapted for ordered and
multinomial choice equations (Dubin and McFadden (1984)). To correct for the initial selection
eﬀect, we also include control functions generated from static labour and poverty equations
for the initial period. As a consequence of the joint modelling of poverty and social assistance
beneﬁt uptake, the poverty line we consider is the oﬃcial threshold for obtaining income
support. Finally, we resort to ex-post microsimulation (Merz (1991)) of three basic strategies
against poverty: increasing the coverage of the minimum income, activation of the unemployed
poor and raising the educational level of vulnerable groups. Using the estimated Markov
model, we simulate the impact of these anti-poverty policies for the representatives of the
respective target groups present in our sample over the period they were observed, i.e. a time
horizon of ﬁve years. In the next section, we present our econometric model. Section two deals
with the data and estimation results. In section three the simulation results are presented.
Finally, section four concludes.
1 Empirical Model
We assume that schooling is determined by the latent propensity for education
s∗
i = α0xi + ui, (1)
and we observe
si = 1, if s∗
i ≤ µ1
= 2, if µ1 < s∗
i ≤ µ2
= 3, if µ2 < s∗
i.
2Assuming that ui are IID according to a type I extreme-value distribution, the probabilities
to observe si = 1,2,3 are given by

















with Λ(y) = ey
1+ey.
In the ﬁrst period, individual i is at work, when her employability
w∗
i1 = β0
1yi1 + β2ds2;i + β3ds3;i + vi1 (3)
is higher than some threshold (0). In that case we observe wi = 1, otherwise wi = 0. We
allow the errors ui and vit to be correlated, but assume a linear dependency between both
error terms
vi1 = β4ui + ηi1. (4)
Taking the expectation of (3) with respect to xit, yit and sit, results in
E[w∗
i1 | xi,yi1,si] = β0
1yi1 + β2ds2;i + β3ds3;i + β4E[ui | xi,yi1,si].
When the instruments for si are valid, it holds that E[ui | xi,yi1,si] = E[ui | xi,si]. This last
expression is also termed the generalized residual (Cox and Snell (1968), Gouriéroux et al.
(1987)) of the schooling model (1-2). Its inclusion in equation (3) removes the bias due to
the correlation between uit and vit. This can also be considered an extension of Heckman’s
(1976, 1978) control function approach to an ordered logistic choice equation, for which the
expressions are given in the appendix.
From the second period on, the individual’s employability is assumed to depend on the
previous state, and its expectation can be written as
E[w∗
it | xi,si,yi1,wi1,yit,wi;t−1] = β0
1;wi;t−1yi1 + β2;wi;t−1ds2;i + β3;wi;t−1ds3;i
+β4;wi;t−1˜ ui + β5;wi;t−1˜ vi1,
under the following linearity assumption
vit;wi;t−1 = β4;wi;t−1ui + β5;wi;t−1vi1 + ηit, (5)
and with ˜ ui = E[ui | xi,si] and ˜ vi1 = E[vi1 | yi1,si,wi1].
The same reasoning can again be applied for the poverty equations, with the modiﬁcation
3that the endogeneity of the initial poverty state will be controlled for by two control functions.
For the ﬁrst period, the propensity for individual i of being in state IP or MI is given by
p∗
i1;1 = γ0
1;1zi1 + γ2;1ds2;i + γ3;1ds3;i + γ0
4;1wi1 + γ5;1ui + γ6;1vi1 + εi1;1
p∗
i1;2 = γ0
1;2zi1 + γ2;2ds2;i + γ3;2ds3;i + γ0
4;2wi1 + γ5;2ui + γ6;2vi1 + εi1;2, (6)








1;1;pi,t−1zit + γ2;1;pi,t−1ds2;i + γ3;1;pi,t−1ds3;i + γ0
4;1;pi,t−1wit







1;2;pi,t−1zit + γ2;2;pi,t−1ds2;i + γ3;2;pi,t−1ds3;i + γ0
4;2;pi,t−1wit
+γ5;2;pi,t−1˜ ui + γ6;2;pi,t−1˜ vit + γ7;2;pi,t−1˜ εi1;1 + γ8;1;pi,t−1˜ εi1;2, (7)
where ˜ εi1;1 and ˜ εi1;2 are again given in the appendix.
Two further remarks are in order. First, we do not fully exploit the panel structure of
our data, nor of the fact that several members of the same household may be included in
the sample. However, White (1982) guarantees that, when the parameters are consistently




















a quantity which can easily be estimated. We apply this method since the use of a ﬁxed eﬀect
estimator would not allow identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of schooling, and random eﬀects merely
allows some eﬃciency gains. Second, the fact that the control function needs to be estimated
in a previous stage, is taken care of by the δ-method. For more details, see the appendix.
2 Estimation
2.1 Data
We consider three educational levels: primary or lower secondary education, upper secondary
education and higher education; two labour market states: part- or full-time working (W) and
non-working (U); and three poverty states:
• Insuﬃcient protection (IP): family income lies below the legally guaranteed minimum
income. For some reason, people in this state forego income support1. Note that some
1For a model of non-uptake see Riphahn (2001).
4individuals in this state may draw an income from work or (other) social beneﬁts. How-
ever this does not lift them above the oﬃcial poverty line.
• Social assistance or minimum income (MI): the municipal social service pays the diﬀer-
ence between earned income and the guaranteed minimum income.
• Non-poverty (NP): family income lies above the minimum income, irrespective whether
it consists of wages or social security beneﬁts.
From the above distinction it is clear that our deﬁnition of the poverty threshold is identical
to the Belgian government’s cut-oﬀ point for receiving social assistance. In the literature
this poverty line is considered to result in an underestimation of the number of poor people.
We nevertheless maintain it for the following reasons. First this threshold distinguishes a
qualitatively diﬀerent part of the population, those entitled to income support. Second, a
higher poverty line would blur the diﬀerence between the IP and the MI states, making a
model accounting for both poverty and social assistance dynamics much more diﬃcult.
The dataset we use is a subset of the Panel Study of Belgian Households (Mortelmans et al.
(2004)), from which we retained all individuals out of school but not yet (early) retired, since
pensioners, children and students are excluded from certain states. Our sample thus consists




The ﬁrst equation estimates the probability for an individual to have achieved a certain level
of education, using an ordered logit model. The results of this estimation procedure are given
in Table 1, from which the following conclusions can be drawn. Women, catholics and younger
birth cohorts generally have achieved higher educational levels. Parental social status also has
the expected positive eﬀect on the educational performance of their oﬀspring. The inﬂuence
of nationality at birth is statistically negligible after controlling for the other determinants.
Likelihood-ratio tests for each group of dummies describing the same underlying continuous
variable, are given in Table 2. Mother’s education is statistically insigniﬁcant at 1%, but
signiﬁcant at 5%, while the other determinants are all signiﬁcant at 1%.
2We reconstructed monthly income data by combining the yearly income and monthly activity variables
from the panel. For a detailed account of the methodology, see Nicaise et al. (2004).
5Table 1: Determinants of educational attainment
Variable b s.e. p
Gender (1=female) 0.0924 0.0542 0.088
Catholic 0.1848 0.0743 0.013
Born in Belgium 0.0445 0.0943 0.637
Born 40s 0.6921 0.1073 0.000
Born 50s 0.8175 0.1009 0.000
Born 60s 1.1071 0.1034 0.000
Born 70s 0.8418 0.1238 0.000
Father unemployed -0.0811 0.3049 0.790
Father blue-collar worker -0.5581 0.0892 0.000
Father white-collar worker 0.4188 0.1094 0.000
Father self-employed 0.0410 0.1124 0.715
Father executive 0.4668 0.1193 0.000
Mother unemployed -0.1891 0.0929 0.042
Mother blue-collar worker -0.3895 0.1325 0.003
Mother white-collar worker -0.2036 0.1337 0.128
Mother self-employed -0.3321 0.1292 0.010
Mother executive -0.3941 0.2631 0.134
Father no education -0.1508 0.1473 0.306
Father lower sec. educ. or less 0.2329 0.1111 0.036
Father upper sec. educ. 0.7412 0.1231 0.000
Father higher education 1.2373 0.1340 0.000
Mother no education -0.6437 0.1414 0.000
Mother lower sec. educ. or less 0.1195 0.1116 0.284
Mother upper sec. educ. 0.6733 0.1278 0.000
Mother higher education 0.8638 0.1466 0.000
intercept 1 0.4262 0.1576




Table 2: Likelihood ratio tests for each group of socio-economic background dummies in table 1
χ2
df d.f. p
Cohort 123.4462 4 0.000
Employment father 139.5040 5 0.000
Employment mother 12.1002 5 0.033
Education father 136.5826 4 0.000
Education mother 120.5392 4 0.000
62.2.2 Employment
The work status dummy-variable (1: working / 0: non-working) was estimated dynamically3
from the second period onward, depending on the work status in the previous period, using a
logit model. This dynamic model will subsequently be used to simulate the eﬀects of activation
and education policies on the poverty transitions. A priori we presume that those policies will
have persistent eﬀects both on labour market and poverty dynamics. In Table 3 we see that
most regressors behave as expected. Education boosts both the probability to get and to stay
at work, with the eﬀect of higher education on access to work being almost twice as high as
its eﬀect on non-exit. Younger people have a higher probability of access to work, but also
of job loss. In other words, youth unemployment is more volatile, while non-employment at
later ages is more persistent. Unemployment in the countryside is also more persistent.
Women and single parents with more children and persons living in large families or in
bad health, all have a lower probability of getting or staying at work. The lower probability
of being at work experienced by non-Belgian EU citizens stems mainly from their slightly
lower probability of keeping their job. The lower rate of employment of non-Europeans, on
the other hand, is mainly caused by a lower probability of access to work. We nevertheless
think that labour market policies targeted at ethnic minorities should focus on inequalities in
job retention as well as on discrimination in hiring.
Finally, the control function derived from the education equation has no signiﬁcant eﬀect
on labour market transitions, but the correction terms with respect to initial employment
status are signiﬁcant. The latter eﬀect points to the presence of an individual-speciﬁc error
component. Indeed, the control functions for the initial conditions can be considered as a
measurement (with error) of the individual-speciﬁc error component. There is thus a strong
selection eﬀect in the labour market dynamics. On top of this selection eﬀect, there is per-
sistence in the probability of being at work: a likelihood-ratio test strongly rejects the null
hypothesis of equality of the coeﬃcients in both job entry and exit probabilities, i.e. the null
of a static model.
2.2.3 Poverty
In this section we discuss the probability of ﬁnding oneself in one of the three poverty states,
conditional on the state in the previous period4. The poverty state is given by a trinomial
nominal variable, with reference category NP.
A ﬁrst striking conclusion with respect to entry into poverty, in Table 4, is the insigniﬁcant
inﬂuence of employment status on the probability to enter MI. However, being at work signiﬁ-
cantly diminishes the probability of becoming insuﬃciently protected. Also, the self-employed
3The static probability of working in the initial period is not reported here (see De Blander and Nicaise
(2005) for details and discussion).
4Again we refer to De Blander and Nicaise (2005) for the static estimation for the initial period.
7Table 3: Determinants of employment
previous state unemployed employed
Variable b s.e. p b s.e. p
Upper sec. educ. 0.5066 0.0992 0.000 0.4583 0.0987 0.000
Higher education 1.3334 0.1573 0.000 0.7014 0.1500 0.000
Age < 25 y. 3.7765 0.2085 0.000 -0.3954 0.1461 0.007
Age 25-34 y. 3.8249 0.2005 0.000 1.0907 0.1403 0.000
Age 35-44 y. 3.4096 0.2012 0.000 1.6700 0.1405 0.000
Age 45-54 y. 2.2956 0.2076 0.000 1.4916 0.1431 0.000
Gender (1=female) -0.7343 0.0681 0.000 -0.9813 0.0573 0.000
Cohabiting 0.2052 0.0749 0.006 0.4328 0.0621 0.000
Household size -0.0373 0.0348 0.285 -0.1398 0.0281 0.000
# children < 12 y. -0.2113 0.0462 0.000 0.0095 0.0393 0.809
# children 12-16 y. -0.2814 0.0885 0.001 -0.1530 0.0754 0.042
Poor health -0.2415 0.0367 0.000 -0.3118 0.0382 0.000
EU citizen -0.2684 0.1416 0.058 -0.3493 0.1345 0.009
non-EU citizen -1.1684 0.2156 0.000 -0.4311 0.1867 0.021
Urban residence 0.1481 0.0636 0.020 -0.1611 0.0564 0.004
Brussels region -0.2369 0.1114 0.033 -0.0880 0.0901 0.329
Walloon region -0.2178 0.0625 0.000 -0.2538 0.0568 0.000
Ec. growth -0.0590 0.0363 0.104 0.0258 0.0353 0.465
Unempl. rate 0.1548 0.1591 0.330 -0.1737 0.1390 0.211
CF* schooling -0.0232 0.0398 0.561 -0.0305 0.0394 0.439
CF initial cond. 0.3870 0.0484 0.000 0.4910 0.0613 0.000
Constant -7.0087 1.4495 0.000 6.0135 1.2635 0.000
# observations 69442 152933
χ2
21 2225.46 0.000 2928.97 0.000
*CF = control function.
8are more likely to enter IP compared to MI.
Both probabilities are inversely proportional to educational level, and decline with age5.
Note that the age-class 45-54 does not ﬁt into this pattern. Younger people are especially
vulnerable to becoming poor, a ﬁnding which calls for special attention for this target group.
Women, singles and smaller families or families with children have a higher probability of
becoming poor. City dwellers and people in bad health have a higher likelihood of obtaining
social assistance, as do people living in the Brussels area or Wallonia.
The control functions for the endogeneity of schooling and the initial working conditions
are not signiﬁcant. The initial poverty conditions and the work transitions are endogenous.
People who ﬁnd (or keep) a job against the (observed) odds, are also more likely to stay out
of poverty.
Table 5 reports the inﬂuence of determinants on the probability of leaving the IP state.
A job signiﬁcantly diminishes the likelihood of a prolonged stay in IP or a transition to MI.
This likelihood is also inversely proportional to educational level. The IP state tends to be
relatively more persistent for the self-employed. Cohabitation and household size improve
the chances of exit from poverty, but children decrease this probability. Bad health seems to
“help” people in ﬁnding assistance.
The initial conditions of both work and poverty do not seem to inﬂuence the exit probability
from IP. People with a high unobserved component in their education also tend to stay longer
in IP, while people with a high unobserved component in their transitions into work have a
higher exit probability from poverty.
We ﬁnally remark that our sample contains only 24 transitions from IP to MI, which
corresponds to a transition probability of 0.53%.
In Table 6 we describe the transition probabilities from the MI state into IP or MI. As
before, the number of transitions from MI to IP is very low and corresponds to a transition
probability of only 0.71%. An obvious conclusion is that the mode of poverty in which people
are situated is very persistent.
Having a job or a better diploma and living together promote exits from social assistance,
while household size and the number of adolescent children increase MI persistence. The
control functions for education and the initial work conditions are not signiﬁcant. On the
other hand, the initial poverty conditions as well as the contemporaneous work transitions
are signiﬁcantly endogenous. As with exit from IP, a high unobserved component in the work
transitions results in a higher exit probability from MI.
Our model generates some insights into direct and indirect causal connections between risk
factors and outcomes in terms of poverty:
• Socio-economic background (in terms of parental education and occupation) strongly
inﬂuences a person’s educational achievement and hence his risk of becoming and staying
5Age-class 55-64 is our reference category.
9Table 4: Probability of becoming poor
From non-poverty to Insuﬃcient Protection Minimum Income
Variable b s.e. p b s.e. p
Working -1.1015 0.1796 0.000 -0.3233 0.3368 0.337
Upper sec. educ. -0.2749 0.1815 0.130 -1.4547 0.4490 0.001
Higher education -0.6826 0.3094 0.027 -2.6427 0.7155 0.000
Self-employed 1.4407 0.1676 0.000 -1.4834 1.0328 0.151
Age < 25 y. 0.9936 0.2503 0.000 1.7335 0.6017 0.004
Age 25-34 y. 0.7677 0.2239 0.001 0.9862 0.5460 0.071
Age 35-44 y. 0.2994 0.2156 0.165 0.8589 0.5077 0.091
Age 45-54 y. 0.3053 0.2008 0.128 1.1961 0.4683 0.011
Gender (1=female) 0.1951 0.1118 0.081 0.3111 0.2314 0.179
Cohabiting -0.5229 0.1172 0.000 -0.8804 0.2578 0.001
Household size -0.4502 0.0759 0.000 -0.1549 0.1131 0.171
# children < 12 y. 0.2260 0.0924 0.014 0.2131 0.1431 0.137
# children 12-16 y. 0.5921 0.1487 0.000 0.5276 0.2393 0.027
Poor health 0.0751 0.0626 0.230 0.2953 0.1095 0.007
EU citizen 0.1414 0.2298 0.538 0.3154 0.3937 0.423
non-EU citizen 0.2084 0.2712 0.442 0.5502 0.4136 0.183
City -0.1556 0.1044 0.136 0.6734 0.2233 0.003
Brussels region -0.6159 0.1858 0.001 0.8051 0.3176 0.011
Walloon region 0.0072 0.1055 0.945 0.5811 0.2535 0.022
Ec. growth 0.0326 0.0433 0.452 0.1496 0.0945 0.113
Unempl. rate 0.4513 0.1760 0.010 0.4836 0.3708 0.192
CF* schooling 0.0986 0.0813 0.225 0.1791 0.1865 0.337
CF init. cond. work -0.0869 0.0556 0.118 -0.0616 0.1100 0.576
CF work -0.4955 0.0419 0.000 -0.2617 0.1816 0.150
CF init. cond. Insuﬀ. prot. 0.3944 0.0441 0.000 0.0441 0.1150 0.702
CF init. cond. Min. Income 0.2182 0.0760 0.004 0.5059 0.1490 0.001




*CF = control function.
10Table 5: Probability of staying poor (transitions from IP)
From Insuﬃcient Protection to Insuﬃcient Protection Minimum Income
Variable b s.e. p b s.e. p
Working -0.7817 0.1705 0.000 -1.8124 0.7628 0.018
Upper sec. educ. -0.2540 0.2319 0.273 -0.2045 0.7349 0.781
Higher education -0.9230 0.4014 0.021 -1.5419 1.3996 0.271
Self-employed 1.5282 0.1749 0.000 0.3162 1.3140 0.810
Gender (1=female) 0.0948 0.1111 0.393 0.6137 0.5714 0.283
Cohabiting -0.2114 0.1271 0.096 -1.5415 0.6967 0.027
Household size -0.1092 0.0540 0.043 -1.7022 0.5763 0.003
# children < 12 y. 0.0682 0.0819 0.405 2.0163 0.8038 0.012
# children 12-16 y. 0.5725 0.1804 0.002 2.5879 0.5473 0.000
Poor health 0.0083 0.0659 0.900 0.4244 0.2511 0.091
non-EU citizen 0.2135 0.2507 0.394 -1.2078 1.4321 0.399
City -0.2031 0.1230 0.099 0.3718 0.5684 0.513
Brussels region 0.3268 0.1998 0.102 -0.7844 0.9231 0.395
Walloon region 0.1488 0.1187 0.210 -0.1937 0.4833 0.689
Ec. growth -0.1463 0.0531 0.006 -0.3802 0.4616 0.410
Unempl. rate 0.0187 0.2060 0.928 1.2859 1.8486 0.487
CF schooling 0.2062 0.1114 0.064 -0.2044 0.2718 0.452
CF init. cond work -0.0192 0.0471 0.683 0.0171 0.1971 0.931
CF work -0.4631 0.0906 0.000 -0.0258 0.2096 0.902
CF init. cond. Insuﬀ. prot. 0.0550 0.0329 0.094 0.0404 0.1525 0.791
CF init. cond. Min. Income 0.0753 0.0685 0.272 -0.0146 0.2209 0.947




*CF = control function.
11Table 6: Probability of staying poor (transitions from MI to IP or MI)
From Minimum Income to Insuﬃcient Protection Minimum Income
Variable b s.e. p b s.e. p
Working 1.0342 1.3064 0.429 -0.8780 0.3679 0.017
Upper sec. educ. 0.3080 1.6194 0.849 -0.4266 0.4362 0.328
Higher education -2.0154 2.2135 0.363 -1.3658 0.7674 0.075
Gender (1=female) -0.1556 0.8118 0.848 -0.3913 0.2771 0.158
Cohabiting -0.9151 1.5123 0.545 -0.9942 0.2515 0.000
Household size -1.0780 0.9879 0.275 0.3051 0.1607 0.058
# children < 12 y. 0.7464 1.0758 0.488 -0.2281 0.2198 0.299
# children 12-16 y. 1.4485 1.0238 0.157 0.7064 0.3480 0.042
Poor health 0.1887 0.4186 0.652 0.1842 0.1425 0.196
non-EU citizen 0.5938 2.1755 0.785 0.7429 0.5487 0.176
City 0.4543 0.8566 0.596 -0.2625 0.2929 0.370
Brussels region -0.2361 1.7224 0.891 0.1962 0.4855 0.686
Walloon region -0.9390 0.9126 0.303 0.1111 0.3030 0.714
Ec. growth 0.2841 0.3467 0.413 0.1432 0.1226 0.243
Unempl. rate -1.7234 1.2064 0.153 -0.9188 0.4832 0.057
CF schooling 0.1015 0.5449 0.852 0.1076 0.1887 0.568
CF init. cond. work -0.7033 0.4855 0.147 -0.0946 0.1243 0.447
CF work -0.8030 0.2151 0.000 -0.5761 0.1133 0.000
CF init. cond. Insuﬀ. prot. 0.7683 0.4549 0.091 0.3826 0.2206 0.083
CF init. cond. Min. Income -0.3439 0.3288 0.296 0.1966 0.0847 0.020




*CF = control function.
12poor. It also lowers the latter risk by increasing the probability of getting and keeping
a job.
• Women obtain higher degrees, but tend to lose this advantage through lower employment
probabilities.
• Younger people enter the labour market better educated, but experience more ﬂuctu-
ations. Even after controlling for employment, low age entails a higher risk of getting
poor, possibly due to lower wages and social security beneﬁts. This also suggests that
better education does not protect younger people completely from poverty.
• Family composition: singles not only ﬁnd it harder to get a job, but are also more vul-
nerable in other ways. For example, they face relatively higher ﬁxed expenses relative
to their income. The presence of younger children not only lowers employment possi-
bilities, but also constitutes a heavy burden on the family budget, thus generating a
twofold poverty risk.
• Being a foreigner (especially from outside the EU) lowers the probability of ﬁnding and
keeping a job. It also lowers family income (after controlling for employment) and the
probability of receiving social assistance.
• Poor health mainly aﬀects employment probabilities, but does not seem to have much
direct eﬀect on the likelihood of falling onto poverty.
• City dwellers are characterised by a higher labour market volatility and higher social
assistance uptake. There also seem to be regional diﬀerences in terms of protection
through the minimum income. Flemish people run a higher risk of IP and have a lower
probability of beneﬁting from social assistance. Whether this pattern results from higher
informal solidarity or voluntary non-take up in Flanders or from greater generosity of
social services in Brussels and Wallonia, is unclear.
• The eﬀects of the economy at large are at least dubious. A higher country-wide un-
employment rate increases inﬂow rates into and decreases exit probability from IP, but
does not seem to have any eﬀect on transition probabilities to and from MI.
3 Microsimulation of Policies
Every anti-poverty policy presumably has a diﬀerent impact on the transition probabilities
between the three poverty states. In the this section, we will examine the eﬀects of three
broad categories of policies, by means of ex-post micro-simulation of some typical examples
of measures:
131. optimization of the coverage of social assistance: every household which becomes poor
will get social assistance,
2. activation: a temporary job is oﬀered to all jobless poor individuals,
3. education: low-skilled individuals are encouraged to obtain a diploma of upper secondary
education.
Each of these strategies can be seen as representing one of three competing views on the
welfare state: the traditional welfare state, the active welfare state or the knowledge-based
society.
In our simulations we assume that the eﬀects of each strategy apply as from January 1993,
the beginning of our observation period. We will indeed apply ex-post microsimulation (Merz
(1991)): each policy will be applied to each member of their respective target groups present
in our database. This procedure allows us to compare the diﬀerent policies without having to
generate hypothetical macro-economic time series nor representative sample individuals.
The target groups consist of people to whom the conditions of the speciﬁc policy apply in
January 1993. We will simulate the policies for these groups only and we do not consider ’late
joiners’ into the respective programmes. For each individual, we know the starting poverty and
employment states, or we can predict them using the static estimations for the initial period.
We also know, for each individual, the labour market and poverty transition probabilities6,
which allows us to construct a time path of probabilities for both employment and poverty
states. Comparing time-paths with and without policy intervention gives an indication of the
impact of this policy over time.
3.1 Full Coverage of the Guaranteed Minimum Income
Under this scenario, everybody in IP in January 1993 receives social assistance. We assume
that reception of income support entails behavioral changes: conditional on observed char-
acteristics, our target group will adopt the transition patterns of the MI group. The target
group in our sample consists of 170 people in the IP state in January 1993.
In Figure 1 three curves are plotted: the baseline probability curve depicts the time-path
of non-poverty (for the target group of the measure) without any policy intervention; the curve
labelled ’predicted probability under the programme’ describes the simulated time-path after
application of the programme. For example, we notice that spontaneous exit out of poverty
amounts to three-quarters after approximately 2 years. The third curve, at the bottom of
the graph, represents the diﬀerence between the probabilities before and after intervention,
with a 95% conﬁdence interval band. As can be seen, the net anti-poverty impact of the
6When a policy aﬀects the labour market transitions, the poverty transition probabilities are obtained by
predicting them with and without employment and then mixing them with the employment probabilities.
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’full coverage’ strategy on the target group is signiﬁcantly negative: approximately 20% more
people (from the group) get stuck into income support, even after ﬁve years.
A successful policy should achieve the following objectives:
1. reduce the severity of poverty (i.e. close the gap between actual income and the minimum
income threshold),
2. lift as many individuals as possible out of poverty by raising the exit rate,
3. prevent new entries into poverty by reducing the entry hazard.
The full coverage scenario achieves only the ﬁrst of these three objectives: it closes the income
gap but at the same time decelerates the exit rate and thus decreases the probability of non-
poverty after ﬁve years signiﬁcantly7 to about 60%. In other words, this approach is purely
curative: it alleviates extreme poverty, but raises the dependency on income support. The
potentially positive eﬀects of services related to social assistance on the exit rate are clearly
oﬀset by a ’poverty trap’ eﬀect.
The impact of increased coverage can also be illustrated in a diﬀerent way. Knowledge
of the transition probabilities allows us to compute some steady-state parameters for each
individual, which, averaged over the target group, are given in Table 7. For comparison, these
numbers are also given for the total sample. The probability of being poor for the population
out of school and not yet retired amounts to 3.15%, two thirds of which do not apply for
7Using a 5% signiﬁcance level.
15Table 7: Steady state characteristics of the full coverage scenario
Total Sample Target Group
no programme 100% coverage diﬀerence
ˆ Pr[NP] 96.85 (6.71) 79.34 (10.40) 63.44 (12.62) -15.90 (15.19)
ˆ Pr[IP] 2.22 (6.68) 15.75 (9.85) 0.0 -15.75 (9.85)
ˆ Pr[MI] 0.93 (0.42) 4.91 (2.30) 36.56 (12.62) 31.65 (11.46)
ˆ E[tNP] 1116.53 (120.28) 116.91 (20.25) 116.91 (5.12) 0.00 (19.37)
ˆ E[tIP] 7.43 (0.92) 13.31 (1.94) 0.0 -13.31 (1.94)
ˆ E[tMI] 8.42 (2.12) 37.35 (27.02) 77.81 (65.61) 40.47 (48.24)
social assistance. The mean duration of a spell in poverty is about 8 months for both the IP
and MI states. Looking at the target group, the picture changes drastically. In the long run
and without extra policy measure, about 21% of the target group live on or below the poverty
threshold, with a mean spell of 13 months in IP and slightly more than 3 years in MI. A policy
of 100% coverage by social assistance would raise the probability of poverty to 36.6% and the
expected duration to almost 6.5 years.
These ﬁndings do sound somewhat paradoxical: strengthening the safety net raises the
poverty risk. Of course this conclusion follows directly from the yardstick with which we
chose to measure the eﬀects of a policy. In no way do we advocate the abolishment of social
assistance, which at least reduces the severity of poverty. On the other hand, this exercise also
shows the potentially adverse eﬀects on the poverty dynamics of an increased social assistance
coverage.
3.2 Activation
In this scenario, the unemployed poor get a job for a period of one year. A ﬁrst expected,
direct eﬀect is that this job will increase the exit probability from, and lower the (re-)entry
hazard into poverty. A second, indirect eﬀect is that persistence in employment will sustain
this eﬀect after the end of the programme.
The target group in our sample consists of 160 individuals in January 1993, who are oﬀered
and supposed to accept a job at that moment. Without any program, about 30% of the poor
unemployed manage to be at work after 5 years. A ﬁrst direct eﬀect of the activation policy
is that the estimated probability of being at work rises by about 5.5% four years after the
programme is ﬁnished. Of the participants, however, more than 60% become unemployed
again. From month 11 up to month 33, the activation programme has a signiﬁcant8 positive
eﬀect on the probability of non-poverty.
In reality, the poverty alleviation eﬀects of this policy will strongly depend on the quality
8Using a 5% signiﬁcance level.
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and the suitability of the job oﬀered, parameters unaccounted for in this simulation. By
setting the ’at work’-dummy equal to one, we implicitly assume that the programme provides
jobs of the same quality as those that are otherwise performed voluntarily by persons with
comparable characteristics (except for the duration which is kept ﬁxed here).
The activation policy (see Figure 2) now seems to aﬀect mainly the timing of poverty exits.
The direct eﬀects are (a) a substantial increase of the exit and (b) a decrease of the entry
probability. After 12 months the programme reaches its maximum impact: it lifts an extra
23% of the participants above the poverty line, compared to the trend without intervention.
Later on, this result diminishes as the policy reaches its ceiling while the baseline poverty
odds keep diminishing. The net residual eﬀect of this programme is about 3.70% four years
after its termination. The modest long-term residual eﬀect of this policy can also be noticed
from Table 8: the steady-state probability of being non-poor increases by about 1.2%. The
mean spell out of poverty, however, increases from 10.5 to 12 years. Eventualy, the diﬀerence
in steady states decays to zero.
3.3 Education
The most recent welfare state paradigm stresses education and knowledge as determining
factors of social integration. We translate this into a scenario where the lowest-skilled are
encouraged to obtain a degree of upper secondary education. In the ’youth variant’, the
target group consists of all low-skilled below the age of 25, in the ’learn-fare’ variety it is made
up of the poor low-skilled younger than 50 years.
The ﬁrst target group in our sample consists of 192 individuals who, in January 1993, are
17Table 8: Steady state characteristics of the activation scenario
no programme activation diﬀerence
ˆ Pr[NP] 74.56 (9.23) 75.76 (11.69) 1.20 (5.33)
ˆ Pr[IP] 12.82 (8.48) 12.17 (0.44) -0.65 (5.14)
ˆ Pr[MI] 12.62 (3.33) 12.07 (2.28) -0.55 (1.48)
ˆ E[tNP] 126.12 (20.18) 141.47 (36.46) 15.35 (19.06)
ˆ E[tIP] 10.58 (1.93) 10.14 (1.56) -0.44 (0.68)
ˆ E[tMI] 47.90 (25.06) 45.11 (17.90) -2.79 (8.19)
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18Table 9: Steady state characteristics of the education scenario, target group < 25 years
no program education diﬀerence
ˆ Pr[NP] 91.80 (13.51) 96.83 (9.71) 5.03 (13.57)
ˆ Pr[IP] 3.33 (12.99) 2.04 (0.07) -1.28 (13.13)
ˆ Pr[MI] 4.87 (1.46) 1.13 (1.11) -3.75 (1.39)
ˆ E[tNP] 342.40 (122.14) 734.34 (54.94) 391.95 (114.30)
ˆ E[tIP] 6.98 (1.12) 5.19 (0.60) -1.79 (1.13)
ˆ E[tMI] 18.20 (6.07) 10.59 (5.07) -7.61 (4.63)
Table 10: Steady state characteristics of the education scenario, target group poor < 50 years
no program education diﬀerence
ˆ Pr[NP] 63.90 (16.62) 80.89 (9.26) 16.99 (13.91)
ˆ Pr[IP] 14.41 (12.83) 10.80 (0.21) -3.60 (10.83)
ˆ Pr[MI] 21.70 (7.45) 8.31 (4.42) -13.39 (6.04)
ˆ E[tNP] 67.78 (26.60) 123.51 (12.59) 55.73 (21.38)
ˆ E[tIP] 12.85 (2.45) 9.96 (1.47) -2.88 (2.32)
ˆ E[tMI] 64.77 (31.38) 38.00 (36.99) -26.77 (19.47)
younger than 25 and have no degree of upper secondary education. Of these 179(93.23%) are
not poor, 4(2.08%) are insuﬃciently protected and 9(4.69%) receive social assistance. The
small number of low-skilled school-leavers living below the poverty line can be explained by the
fact that most of them still live with their parents. Some form of protection seems to spring
from their social capital. However, since we consider a period of 5 years, our model should
implicitly account for the period in which these youngsters leave their parental household to
live on their own. Nevertheless, a degree of upper secondary education seems to oﬀer some
extra and lasting protection against poverty of slightly over 5%.
In the second variant (learnfare), the target group consists of 67 low-skilled poor respon-
dents below the age of 50. Figure 4 again shows the lasting eﬀects of increased education.
From month 29 on, these positive eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant9. The probability of being
above the poverty line increases by 17%. This relatively large impact is also reﬂected in a 40%
decrease of the mean spell duration in social assistance.
3.4 Policy implications
Despite the methodological and data problems discussed in sections 1 and 2, the following
conclusions seem to emerge from our analysis.
9Using a 5% signiﬁcance level.
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• Raising the coverage of social assistance, while alleviating the harshest eﬀects of poverty,
also tends to increase the number of poor through the poverty trap eﬀect. Admittedly,
the ﬁndings relate to the period 1993-1997 in Belgium, in the context of a sluggish
economy and rather ’passive’ income compensation policies. In the mean time, work
incentives have been built into the social assistance regulations and beneﬁts have been
linked with activation. Nevertheless, the simulation warns against the possible perverse
eﬀects of mere income compensation.
• Getting people into work for a limited period (one year) aﬀects mainly the timing of
the poverty exits, but has less eﬀect on the steady state parameters. Exits from poverty
accelerate in the short short run. However, the longer-term impact of activation is very
modest unless high-quality jobs are oﬀered (e.g. combinations of work and training).
• The education scenario appears to yield the most substantial and durable eﬀects, espe-
cially when focused on those living in poverty (learnfare variant).
In order to make the estimated eﬀects of the three strategies comparable, we have to take into
account the size diﬀerences of the initial target groups. To do so we reweighed the reported
results. In Table 11 the poverty impact of policies is reported as a percentage of the overall
group of poor people (IP and MI) in the initial period (226 individuals). Raising the coverage
of social assistance will increase the steady state fraction of poor people by up to 11.96%.
This result is the net eﬀect of the decreased share of under-protected people (11.85%) and the
increased share of people receiving social assistance (23.81%). The net steady-state impact
for the activation policy, during the fourth year after the programme amounts to 0.85%, but
20Table 11: Net steady-state impact of policies as a fraction of the total number of poor in the
initial period
NP IP MI
100% coverage -11.96% -11.85% +23.81%
Activation +0.85% (0%) -0.46% (0%) -0.39% (0%)
Education of the young +0.29% -0.07% -0.22%
Education of the poor +5.04% -1.07% -4.03%
theoretically, it further decays to zero further in the future. The relatively small ﬁgures for
the ’youth variant’ of the education policy reﬂect the fact that only 13% of the target group
was poor as well. The fraction of originally poor people helped by the programme is thus
accordingly small.
Upon comparing the strategies with each other, increasing the coverage of MI has (by
deﬁnition) the highest impact on extreme poverty (IP), while improving education of the
low-skilled has the highest overall impact (IP and MI), strikingly more than activation of the
unemployed. And yet, all in all, none of the simulated strategies appear to provide the panacea
against poverty. More perversely, the major part of the gain in non-poverty10 originates from
a reduction in the fraction of people receiving the minimum income, while the sub-population
of really poor seems less aﬀected.
The rather modest impact of our simulations is of course partly due to the criterion we use
to compare the diﬀerent policies (fraction of the initially poor who remain poor in the long
run), which is of course aﬀected by a sizable deadweight eﬀect. The negative connotation of
the latter term seems rather unfair, since the fact that so many initially poor ﬁnally escape
poverty reﬂects both the eﬀectiveness of other existing poverty-alleviating measures and the
adaptability of human nature to diﬃcult conditions.
4 Conclusion and Further Research
In this paper we model employment and poverty states as a discrete ﬁrst-order Markov process,
taking into account endogeneity of schooling. Using this model, we then evaluate the impact
of diﬀerent policies on the poverty dynamics by ex-post microsimulation. The policies we
assess are exemplars of currently prevailing social policy paradigms: the traditional welfare
state, the active welfare state and the knowledge-based society. When the duration of poverty
spells or the probability of being poor is taken as the criterion for evaluation, our research
indicates that (a) increased coverage of the guaranteed minimum income has adverse eﬀects,
(b) activation has large short-term and small long-term positive eﬀects, and (c) learnfare has
10Except for the 100% coverage scenario.
21lasting positive eﬀects.
At the same time, our dynamic approach proved to be much more realistic in predicting
the impact of policies. Given the high degree of mobility into and out of poverty, the net
eﬀects of anti-poverty measures appear to be much smaller than a static model would predict.
Moreover, depending on the type of policy adopted, long-term eﬀects may be much greater or
smaller than short-term eﬀects.
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24A.1.2 Work Equation
Deﬁning ˜ ui = E[ui | xi,si] and ˜ vi1 = E[vi1 | yi1,si,wi1], we have
E
h











































1yit + β2ds2;i + β3ds3;i + β4˜ ui,
for the ﬁrst period, and
mit;wi;t−1 = β0
1;wi;t−1yi1 + β2;wi;t−1ds2;i + β3;wi;t−1ds3;i + β4;wi;t−1˜ ui + β5;wi;t−1˜ vi1,
for the other periods.
A.1.3 Initial Poverty Equation













1−Λ(ni1;j) ln[Λ(ni1;j)] if i 6= j,
with
ni1;k = γ0
1;kzi1 + γ2;kds2;i + γ3;kds3;i + γ0
4;kwi1 + γ5;kui + γ6;kvi1,
see Dubin and McFadden (1985).
B Correction of the Asymptotic Covariance-matrix for Gener-
ated Regressors11
Consider a multivariate model with log-likelihood equal to
f (yi,zi | xi;α,β) = g(yi | zi,xi;α,β)h(zi | xi;β).
11See for instance Gong and Samaniego (1981), Murphy and Topel (1985), Parke (1986), Pierce (1982),
Randles (1982) and Vella and Verbeek (1999).
25Maximize now ﬁrst
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with λ the generalized residual from the estimation of β by maximizing
P
i lnh(zi | xi;β).
The Taylor series of ∂ lng
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At the optimum, ˆ α, the LHS is equal to zero, resulting in
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Asymptotic independence of the ﬁrst two terms on the RHS implies
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Estimation of α by pseudo-maximum likelihood, compels us to adapt (8) as follows
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. The quantities H11, H12 and Q11 can be consistently estimated
by replacing expectations by sample means.
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